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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA 
LNG TERMINAL 
Joanne Linnerooth 
Introduction* 
D wing the last d d e ,  three liqudied natural gas ( L N G  ) projects were proposed for Cali- 
f omia A t this writmg, Pacific Lighting Corporation and Pacific G as and Electric C ornpany are 
stilt seeking government permits for two of these proje* involving the import of liqudied 
natural gas from Indonesia and South Alaska The third LNG project proposed in 1974 by the 
El Paso Company, was to bring Alaskan North Slope gas by ocean caniers to a receiving termi- 
nal in Southern California This proposal has been rejected in favor of an overland pipeline. 
While these three projects are interrelated, this case history will focus on the Indonesian 
L N G  project The intent of this brief history is to outline the most important events of this 
decade-long conhversy (for more detailed EE histories, see A hem 1978, and W estem 1978). 
A d i s k o n  of the issues underlying this controversy follows (See the Appendix for a Sum- 
mary of M ajor Events Timetable.) 
The b reprted in this ~aper is suprted by the Bun-un fuer Forsdnmg and Techmlogie. 
F.R.G , wnhd m. 321fi91fiGB 8001. W hile q p r t  for this work is &dully acknowledged, the views 
~ e p e t h e ~ o r ' s o w n .  m d a r e n o t n ~ y ~ b y t h e q w n s a r .  
The Initial Pursuit of a Terminal Site 
Based on p jections of d e c r e m  natural gas supplies and increasing needs, Padic Light- f' ing Coptation began in the late 196Us to pursue supplies from Indonesia and Cook Inlet, 
A l a h  In 1972, a letter of intent was w e d  by Pdndonesia and Pertarnha (the Indonesian 
stateowned oil company) for the purdmse of LNG at the mte of about 540 million cubic feet 
per day. A fter three years of price negotiations, the L N G contrad was approved by the Indone- 
sian government 
Meanwhile, Pacific Lighting Corpodon had created a subsidiary, the W estem LNG Ter 
rninal Company (W estan) for the purpose of pl- and building two import. terminaLs. In 
1972. W estem was joined by the El Paso Natural Gas  Corrrpany which was seeking a site to 
receive gas from Alaska's North Slope After somewhat limited site screening, the Port of Los 
A ngeles was chosen to r e ~ i v e  gas from Cook Inlet and 0 xnard was chosen to receive gas from 
Indon- bemuse El Paso had a corporate policy of not siting a LNG fadity within ten miles 
of a populzlted area, the remDte Point Conception (Little Cojo Bay) site was chosen to receive 
gas from the North Slope. 
In 197 . ap 'cations for e a h  of these sites were fled with the Federal Powa Commig 
sion (FPC).' 1nNwrt of the ppulakd Los Angeles and O x n a r d  sibs, W e s t w  mmmirr 
sioned two risk assessment studies (Scienoe Ap@i&ions. Inc 1975ab) which showed the 
safety risks to be acceptably low. Based upon probabiities of marine and shore LNG opedions 
these reports genemted estimates of the likelihood thak rnernbem of the public would be killed 
during any one year from terminal operations In the usual manner, these risks were m e  
b other possible causes of death induding, e.g., ill health and occupatonal hazards As 
required by f e d 4  law, environmental impad statements for both sides were prepared by the 
Federal Power Comrnision (F'PC). In addition, Oxnard commissioned a separate study of the 
environmental effects (SocirsEconornic Syshm,  un-) . 
In December, 1977, after three ymrs of hearings the F'PC conditionally approved the 
Oxnard site, but the Port. of Los Angeles was rejected as a possible site upon the dimvery of 
an earthquake fault (for a aitical review of this lengthy approval procxss, see W estem 1978). 
El Paso's &erne to import gas from Alaska's North Slope to Point Concernon was rejeded in 
favor of a competing pipeline project through Canada 
A Stalemate 
The local reactions to federal approval of Oxnard and to federal rejection of the Port. of 
Los Angela were both enmuraging and discouraging to the oil companies. The Los A ngeles 
City Cound voted Vt the benefits of the $155 million terminal outweighed the risks posed by 
the earthquake fault; a l ~ v e l y ,  the citizens of Oxnard became sensitized to the risks of the 
planned $300 million t,emina14 The 0 xnard public r edon .  ignited by a published worst-case 
mident scenario, and fueled by growing disagreements m n g  the expert corrlmLlnity over the 
rkb from LN G , slowed the approval process. 
Though W estem would have liked to defend its position at 0 x n d  by pointing out that 
the terminal muld meet all standards and regulations governing terminal design and opmhon, 
the reality was that a cornp-ehensive set of federal regulations to ensure public safety did not 
exist D uring deliberations on thege three LNG terminals, both the Coast Guard (CG) and the 
Office of P i m e  Safety (OPSO) made moves proposing LNG kxminal safety regulations. 
These regulations have only quite recently been rnade available (see U .S. D eparhnent of Tmn- 
sportation 1980qb). Because the diffiarlt task of assuring the safe opelation of an LNG termi- 
nal fell on the shoulders of the nonexpert load mthorities rrruch -of the blame for the unm 
tainties and problems sunnunding LNG terminal sitmg has been seen to lie with the federal 
egencies (A hem 1978). 
The relationships between the federal authorities and the state authorites for LNG facility 
approval and siting is deliberately vague. The fedeml government, by choosing not to darify its 
mandate, has in effed chosen not to challenge state authority. In f& the DOE has intention- 
ally avoided a wnfrontation in the Califomia -, in spite of their advocacy of the Oxnard site. 
Thus, though federal and local appmval of a site was viewed as necessary, the final approval 
was vested in a state agency--the California Coastal Commission (CCC), which was created in 
1976, is composed of 12 lay people appointed from a variety of sources and serving only part- 
time, and has responsibiity for the protection of the California coastline. After much @ul 
deliberation, the CCC decided against siting a facility in a populated area in favor of a remote 
spot on the beautiful California coastline; that is, they decided "against b i i  and for people." 
In 1975, the CCC advised W e s h  b pursue more actively the remote Point Conception (Lime 
Cojo Bay) site. 
A t this point, W estem faced a stalemate involving all three levels of government 0 n the 
federal level, the FPC,hERC in favor of the Oxnard site, but the U.S. President's National 
Energy Plan called for r em~te  siting of LNG terminals The FPC,hXRC also deemed likely tD 
deny the Port of Los Angeles site on grounds of the recently discovered earthquake fault, 
though this site was favored by the local authorities. Again on the local level, the authorities of 
Oxnard seemed i n c r e m l y  unlikely to approve a terminal, and W estem faced a oomplex and 
lengthy approval process with k t a  Barbara County whch held appva l  authority over the 
Point Conception site. On the state level it seemed unlikely that the CCC, placing priority on 
public safety, wuld be convinced that an LNG terminal was safe enough for the O x n d  and 
Los Angeles populated areas But the CCC also faced problems in approving the remote Point 
Conception site, where the marine life, kelp beds. surfing breaks and views 
represented the types of resources the CCC was created to proteck To oompli& an already 
complex situation, this site was being actively opposed by the Bixby & Hollister ranch m o d +  
tions who owned the land and by the Sierra Club, which opposed LNG on two fronts: they 
argued that California did not need the gas, but if it were imported the facility should be on a 
remote site. In S-y, W estem faced the possibility of not obtaining all the needed appro- 
vds for any of the three sites 
The LN G Terminal A ck of 1977 
In view of this impending stalemate the utility mmpanies tunled to the state legdatare 
for help. Their goal was to remove permit- authority from the many local interests and the 
CCC and tD p l a  it in the hands of the more congenial Califomia Public Utilities Cormmission 
(CPUC). The CPUC was the principal state body involved in power plant issues, primarily in 
the  ates setting pmcess 
The initial legislation (Bill ABZZO), introduced by A ssemblyrnan C oggin in response to 
the growing concern over LNG safety, w a ~  however, not acceptable to the utility companies. 
Though it would have given the CPUC exdusive authority to certify aproposed LNG facility, it 
required that the CPUC consider the feasibility of both remote on-shore and off- ore sites. In 9 
addition, it required that the C C C and the C aliornia Energy Commission (CE C) off a second 
omens on the feasibility decision The Energy Comrnission was known to oppose the CPUC 
on the question of LNG for California; in its 1977 policy report to the I,egislad;ure, the Com- 
mission raised questions about L N G  safety, needs and costs. In the opinion of W eskem, this 
bi would have effectively prevented the sihg of L N G fadlities in C aliiomia ( W estem 1978). 
So W estem's parent company went to M e  for a rival bill (S.1081) which vested the CPUC 
with ne-stop licensing authority, p-eduding any real interfemoe from the Energy Commis 
sion +' 
The resulting legislation was a coqmnlise between the envimrxnentalisk+ who supporkxi 
considemtion of off-shore sites, and those who saw an urgent need for an LNG facility t~ 
asslire energy and jobs The CPUC was chose* over the more conservation-minded California 
Energy Cornmission as the a g q  with stad;e wt authority, preempting local governments. 
As a bow to the conservationists, the CCC was given the mandate to choose and to mnk psi- 
ble sites, and to pass these rankings on to the CPUC. I t  was agreed that the site would not be 
off-shore, as some environmentalists wished nor could it be in a populated area, as the gas util- 
ities wished. Indeed, a nonpopulated area was strictly defmed There could be no more than 
an average of 10 people per square mile within one mile of the terminal, and no more than 60 
people pa square mile within four miles of the terminaL 
The Present Status of C allfornia' s LN G Terminal 
In aocoldance with the Sitrng Act of 1977, the CCC evaluated 82 sites, 18 of which were 
nominated by the public The CC C as re-d by law to I-ank the dtes proposed by the appli- 1Y 
cants. Of these 82 sites only four, including the Point Conception site, met the population 
standards, and were not infeasible becao-zse of adverse wind and wave mnditions earthquake 
falts, soil oonditions, or other factors. The C C C passed these mnkings on to the CPUC, which 
. . 
~ t d  all but the third-mnked Point Conception site, fmding that transients (campers, etc) 
near the sites, on mads and at public phs, made the other sites unsafe. 
This, however, was not the end of the story. D wing the course of this screening process 
earthquake faults were discovered at Point Conception. For this reason. the CPUC muld only 
conditonally approve the site, stating in its July 1978 (the deadline dab= set by the 1977 Siting 
Act) dedsion that this approval was conditional on W e s b  showing that the faults presented 
an acceptable risk to the terminal. 
A t  the same time as the state p-, W estem had filed with the fedeml government 
for a license to imprt gas to Point Conception W ith the reorganizai5on of the D epartment of 
Energy, the Pdndonesian file was trandened fmm the ERA to the FERC, which undertook 
an extensive environmental assessment Though the staff of the FERC p r e f e d  the Oxnard 
site, the Commission decided in fmor of Point Conception to avoid a further confmntation 
with California law. This approval was conditional upon the results of the fault investigations. 
These invesbgations have revealed additional faults at Point Concepbon Spurred by this 
new information, as well as by a growing sense that California may not need, or want, Indone- 
sian nahral gas, opponents have appealed the decision at the federal level. A t  this time, the 
W ashingbn, D .C. Court of Appeals has remanded the case to the FERC, requestmg an unmn- 
ditional "go" or ''no-go." Another mund of hearings, briefs and counte~briefs will follow. W e 
await the decision 
Some Issues Raised by the California Sitmg Process 
In the following. the more obvious imes  that have become apparent from our study of 
California's siting pl~cess are listed This List is not in any senst! compl.ete and should be mn- 
sidemd in the broader context of the '!Issues Papep' by the IIASA /?d M 'I' Risk Group. I t  is 
hoped that the following discussion will serve as a starting point for discussion! with the T& 
Force M eeting participts 
1. In the di-ion of siting issues, it is important to begin by m&mg the distinction 
between the question of vhether to site the facility and that of uhem to g te  the fadlity. 
W hether to have a fxility ultimately depends upon d o n a 1  (regional) interusts or objec- 
tives In the energy debate, the lines a~ often drawn between two different obj~tives or 
futures one of large-scale technology, high economic growth rates, and a centralized level 
of decisionmaking; or one of small-scale technology using, where possible, renewable 
resounzs or recycling, steady-state economy, and decentmlized decisionmakmg. The 
resolution of this mnflid will depend on the political system where national goals are 
anived at through an i n t e d o n  of various interests In the m e  of the California LNG 
contmversy, these interests or "stakeholderd' include the industry or utilities the federal, 
state and local govemmenk the organized d o n  groups; the unorganized consumers 
those who benefit fmm an unspoiled coastline and those who benefit, as we.  as those who 
do not, from genemhzd economic p w t b  The question of how legi- the stakehold- 
ers view the political dedsion process is a basic isue which is germane to most of what 
follows here. 
The question whether to employ a technology is often lost in the debate over where to 
site the f ad i ty .  This seems to have been the case in California where, at least at the state 
level, the question of need was first debated quite late in the process On the federal 
level, it is interesting that the utilitieS projections of gas needs were adopted by the 
Federal Power Commission The only dissenting voice was from the California Energy 
Commission, a rival of the CPU C, which published a low-energy scenario for California 
Though the Energy Commission might have been a logical choice to make the final siting 
decision (its mandate to .site electricity genemting plants could hare been extended to 
LNG facilities), the Legislature in the 1977 Siting A ct chose instead to give s i h g  author 
ity to the CPUC whose Fkimary role had been a financial regulatory agency. In the Siting 
A d, the L egis1ahu.z explicity decided the question of whether to hme a LNG f adity and 
tried to ensure prompt remlution of the sihng pmblem by its choice of the CPUC. How- 
wer, this decision was made nearly five years after such a f d t y  had been proposed by 
the utilities 
2. This brings up the question of the of the decision pmcess In the U.S. energy 
s e h r  most projects are initiated by the industry, as opposed for example, to the tmnspor 
tation s e b r  where projects (roads, etc) are planned by the government and canied out 
by private ind- after competitive bid-. A desirable rnix of public and pnvak enter 
pise involves Meoffs between the advantages of private initiakive and those of national 
Planning- 
3. More specific to the above issue is that of one-stop licensing. Before 1977, the direction 
of the California process was dearly bohmb- top  since it was necessary for the industry 
to obtain permits from scores of local authorities However, this pithre was changed by 
the 1977 Siting A d  which gave one agency, in this case the CPUC, the mandate to grant a 
siting permit (it was also necessary to have federal approval, but the D O E  appeared wil- 
Lug to accept the decision of the state). There are obvious pros and oons in this shop 
tened pcedure, depending to a large extent on nakional objectives. Because an LNG 
fadlity aan benefit the greater population, but can -unpose costs (risks) on a srnaLl local 
population, a procedure requiring local approval inevitably proves difficult Yet, if the 
decision process itself is important, taking the decision out of local contml is clearly 
u n d e d l e .  
4. An issue related to the question of local sovereignty is that of the appmpriate incentive 
system for choosing an acce@ably safe site. If the local government has veto power, it is 
possible that. industry would be cornpelled to locate where it receives the least resistance, 
ie., in remte areas, or to compensate local communities for the risks A nother related. 
and important, question is who is l i i l e  for an LNG accident? 
5. A diffcult question is how the decision process itself c a n  be evaluated. what are the 
relevant indimtom'? Included here might be the following: 
-- Is there a forum for public debate? 
-- W hat are the delays? 
-- Are all the altematives considered? 
-- D oes it encourage the best posible outcome in view of the opposing interests? 
-- How legitimate do the stakeholdem view the process? 
The move to one-hp licensing seems b represent a tradeoff between the first two of the 
above. The putpse of the 1977 Siting Act was to ensure the siting of an LNG terminal 
without extensive delay--& some saaitice in local prticipation This Act, in the interest 
of maximizing public safety and minimizing further delay, might have preduded finding 
an optimal site by i m p o e  the population and the on-shore siting oonstraints. By 
"optimal" we can begin by asking whether, in the absence of these constraints, a site could 
have been identified that would have been viewed as more de*le by aU the parties. A 
more difficult definition of "optimal" would involve making equity judgments, or finding a 
site that would have been preferred by some people at the expense of others. It seems 
that the 0 ard site was finrored by nearly all the stakeholders includmg the utilities. the 3 Sierra Club. the CPUC, the CEC, and the FERC. A puzzling question is how a site that 
had support from so many opposing groups could have been ruled out by the political 
representatives. 
Finally, we might want to consider if this process either pe or post- the 1977 legislation. 
encourages an imaginative consideration of all the posible altematives. For instance, is it 
necessary to have one large facility, or could one imagine a series of s t o v e  facilities 
presenting risks on the same order as peak-shaving plants looatad in indwhial areas? Or ,  
were the possibilities for off-shore siting given sufficient consideration? Where a project 
is defined by indushy before it is considered by government planners, there exists the 
danger of tying the decisions to minor variations of the pposed concept 
6. Turning to the role 'fi&' played in this process presents a number of exciting issues. 
There are, of course, technical problems of e s b d h g  the possible consequences and their 
pbabilities determining the error bands for existing ed i rmk  and designing tests, 
experiments and models for improving these estirnaks. An equally important p b l e m  
concerns the public perception of the ridc what f&m or dimensions of the hazard 
explain the obsaved reactions can plblic response be in any sense predicted? W hat role 
do the media. the information c m p i g m  and published risk -ts play'? Here 
andogies to the nudear power debate become apparent--me-scale technology, low- 
probabiity, high-consequence evenk involuntary, pssive exposure, & 
Of particular interest is the cZbstmphic or potential holocaust dimension of the risk 
which seems from a number of published sources to have played a major role in public 
~ p t i o n  of nudsar power. In the case of LN G ,  this aspect of the risk nlight be viewed 
as hiwing been the decisive element in the California LNG sting debate. 0 ne posible 
hypothesis is that the siting procedure would hiwe proceeded routinely, that is after corn 
pletion of all the necessary reports and hearings, the facility would hwe been located at 
Oxnard as recommended by the FPC, had it not been for one uudal event. the publim 
tion of a worst-we scenario showing that 50.000 residents of O x n a r d  could be victims of 
an ignited LNG v a p r  cloud. After publication of this report not only the public, but atl 
the relevant govenurment agencies with the exception of the FPCBERC, heaame inmas 
ingly risk averse. This report seems to have had considdably more effect on sensibzing 
the public to the risks of LNG than an earlier event., the explosion of an oil tar- in the 
Los Angeles harbor. The latter showed that an accident was poeble whereas the f o m r  
showed that a holocruJst was po&ble! The differences in public &on might be 
explained by the existence of a m ~ v e l y  well-oxanized opposition in Oxnard draw- 
ing espedally from the 10,000 e d e n t s  who wae within a twvrnile radius & the pro- 
posed fadlity. Y Yet, the pubIi4on of a catastrophe scenaio d n l y  klad a pfound  
effed. (This is especially interesting sin= it seems that there wm a turning p in t  
in the siting of an LNG f d i t y  in the Netherlands) 
7. Another important issue concerns the costs of the decigon pmoess One estimate by the 
utility puts the cost of delay at about $1 million per day. To this figure one would have to 
add the costs of the myriad of repork hearings consultants, etc. How would the final 
figure compare with the extm cost of remote siting of an off-shore facihty, of a more (or 
less) expensive alternative to LNG ? W o d d  it be possible, for example, to move the 
residents fmm the two-mile radius (or a Smile d u s )  of the O x n d  site at a cost less 
than that of the amkernme decision process? 
8. A nother p i n t  that might be inveshgated is the absenoe of any sort of referendum on the 
LNG question in California for Los Angeles, Oxnard,  or Point Conoeption Could the 
results of su& a referendum be ex pst  predicted? 
9. In this regard, a decision-analytic framework might be an appropriate starting p i n t  The 
most important role for a systematic approach to deciGonmalang is to help specify a likely 
scenario with resped to a partidar p b l e m  based on &srxlssions with the key stakehold- 
ers. In so doing, it is ~ c u l a r l y  important to specify the set of decisions that have to be 
made and the mle e& stakeholder is likely to Nay with resped to e& of the many deci- 
sions. 
NOTES 
1. Pacific Lat ing Corpomtion is the parent holding company of Southern California Gas  
Co. Pdndoneda and W estem are now 50% owned by Pacific G a s  and Eledzic Co. and 
Pzdic Lighting Corporation. 
2. The FPC was essentially a finanrial regulatory agency with a mandate to regul* pricing 
policies and &aged with approving gas import projecfs. In 1977, it was absorbed by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Agency (FERC) and the Energy Regulatory A dministration 
(ERA) of the newly created D epartrnent of Eneqy. 
3. The explosion of the ship, Sansinena. in the harbor (D eoernba, 1976), did shake the 
C oundl' s beliefs; however, after mmrnisdoning a 'thorough" study, the C ound voted 
almost unanimously in favor of the tern. 
4. The population of Oxnard is apywxirnately 100,000; around #),000 persons would be liv- 
ing within two miles of the planned farility, but only very few people within one mile. 
5. The Coast Guard, under the D epadmmt of Transportation (D OT), exercises marine 
safety regulatory authority over LNG tanka construction and opembrs and over prk of 
the terminal. The OPSO, also a part of D OT. has on-shore regulatory authority. There 
exists a memo of understanding for these overlapping mandates. 
6. The California Energy Resources Conservation and D evelopment Commission (the 
Energy Commission) was created in 1974, by. as the title suggests, both the environmen- 
talists and the utility interests. The Cornnrisdon was &arged with the promotion of mn- 
sewation and alternative technologies and was given the mthority to issue power @mt dt- 
. . ing c e r t i f i b - a  way of s h m d m q  the siting proc~dures (For a brief m e  history of 
the Commission see M cD onald 1979.) 
7. The CEC reports to the legislature in a biennial reprt on California's f u b  eneqy needs 
and suFpLies I t  has developed a mphisticahd forec~~ding model which generated demand 
pjections below those of the CPUC and of industry. The role of the CEC in the LNG 
siting process is one of technical consultant to the CPU C. 
8. These sites, in order of their I-anldng, are the U . S. M arine Corps base at Camp Pendelton, 
Rattle Snake Canyon. Point Conception and Deer Canyon 
9. The S e m  Club changed its stand in early 1977 to oppose the Oxnard site. 
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